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Abstract 
 
In this chapter, we examine how agencies build organizational political 
capacities (OPC) for reputation management, where capacity building is treated 
as a challenge underpinned by the learning relationships that exist between key 
governance actors. This challenge requires the development of four types of 
OPC: absorptive capacity (ACAP); administrative capacity (ADCAP); analytical 
capacity (ANCAP) and communicative capacity (COMCAP). Analytically, we 
link each of these capacities to one particular type of policy learning—reflexive 
learning—which characterizes politicized situations where an agency’s 
reputation is under threat and citizens are the main governance partners. 
Empirically, we demonstrate how agencies learn to develop these OPCs with 
governance partners using the case of the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
which increasingly aims to engage citizens in a dialogue to combat the negative 
images attached to health and safety regulation. We conclude by asking what a 
learning approach tells us about how agencies can develop OPC. 
 
9. 1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we examine how agencies build organizational capacities to 
manage their reputations. The literature on organizational capacities does not 
treat them as simply static skills or resources. Rather, capacity-building 
challenges—i.e. what capacities are required and whether or not they are 
successful in policy delivery—are mediated by a range of contextual factors. In 
particular, capacities are held in the relationships between different governance 
actors. Given the array of different organizational capacities and governance 
relationships that can exist, this chapter focusses on organizational political 
capacity (OPC) construction (Wu et al., 2015). We treat capacity as held in 
dynamic learning relationships that exist between policymakers and citizens. We 
relate OPC to one type of policy learning – reflexive learning. This is learning in 
the realm of ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) where agencies’ control 
over policy definition and implementation is uncertain. Here problems are 
 incomplete, and ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ solutions are replaced by a multiplicity of 
policy options offered by citizens that claim expertise. Such cases are often 
complicated further by the amplification role played by the media. These 
politicized conditions are ripe for policy failure and the politics of blame (Hood, 
2011) where government agencies become the focus of dissent. In such 
circumstances, the challenge for reputation-sensitive agencies is to find ways to 
engage society, and explore the variety of interpretations attached to the issue at 
hand. Critically, policymakers must recognize that in such reflexive settings their 
control over problem definition and policy solutions may be weak. Here, the 
agency’s OPC is critical both for future policy success and the agency’s 
reputation. 
But just as policy learning is not monolithic, nor is OPC. Therefore our 
chapter addresses the following question. What particular OPCs are required in 
reflexive learning environments? We construct an analytical framework that 
outlines the four main learning relationships found in the policy world and use 
this typology to differentiate between the types of OPC that matter and when. 
Why take a learning approach to organizational capacity? We know a good deal 
about the ideational dimension of policy learning, but scholars have largely 
neglected the organizational dimension (Borrás, 2011). Yet, it is only by making 
these connections that we can hope to illuminate the relationship between 
governance and learning (Schout, 2009). Examining capacity building through 
the policy learning lens acknowledges it as a fundamentally dynamic exchange—
where different learning environments enable new capacities to be acquired, and 
capacity in turn enables policy learning and change. 
Empirically, the chapter examines this in relation to an innovative UK 
health and safety communications initiative: the ‘Myth-Busters Challenge Panel’ 
(MBCP). Launched in 2012, by regulator the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
the MBCP is a high-profile campaign that aims to engage citizens in a dialogue 
about the negative images that have become attached to health and safety 
regulation in the UK. Indeed, in the last decade, public scepticism is such that the 
expression ‘health and safety gone mad’ has entered common parlance to express 
exasperation about almost any rule—real or fictitious—that businesses, local 
authorities and citizens think an unnecessary intrusion. Three key drivers of this 
recent negative branding have been identified (Dunlop, 2015). Health and safety 
regulations are erroneously cited by businesses and local authorities due to: 
uncertainty of the law and fear of compensation claims; the desire to reduce costs 
and prevent citizens from accessing goods and services; and finally, poor 
communications skills and the desire to avoid an argument by giving a genuine 
explanation. 
In an effort to rebuild the public image of health and safety regulation, and 
the reputation of the Health and Safety Executive itself, the MBCP aims to 
 connect with citizens, businesses, the media and local authorities by inviting 
them to submit examples where health and safety has been used to justify action 
or inaction which they view unreasonable or suspect. These cases are then 
referred to a dedicated panel of experts who investigate the case, gather 
additional evidence and adjudicate. Where health and safety ‘myths’ are 
identified, the agency uses the cases—many of which are absurd and on occasion 
hilarious—as part of its wider communications strategy. In some circumstances, 
the agency also works with the parties involved to generate mutual learning and 
develop a corrective strategy. The ultimate goal of this initiative is to enhance the 
health and safety policy regime and defend the agency by building a social 
consensus around what protective, desirable and high public value health and 
safety looks like. 
After three years of operation and the identification of nearly four hundred 
‘myths’, the agency is now exploring the logic of its communication with the 
public, how its impact can be assessed and how its communication strategy 
should be developed. This chapter marks the first academic assessment of the 
initiative, and draws on ethnographic research and elite interviews with the 
MBCP’s policy, analytical and communication officers conducted by the author 
from September 2013 to September 2015.1 Why should we care about this case? 
While concerted public communications strategies by agencies are common in 
some countries—especially the United States—it is rare for a UK regulator to 
engage citizens in a direct dialogue. It is rarer still for a researcher to have a front 
row seat to witness this ‘live’ episode of capacity building. The importance of 
this access to the HSE team is pivotal for our analytical approach. Treating OPC 
building as a function of learning relationships demands that we understand the 
views of elite policymakers and how they interpret their context. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 defines the capacity 
challenges faced by the HSE as a function of learning in governance 
relationships. Section 2 outlines a policy learning typology and specifically the 
reflexive form which characterizes wicked issues where agencies must learn how 
to engage citizens (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013; Dunlop, 2014). Section 3 puts the 
spotlight on reflexive learning, using typological analysis to expand the concept 
to identify four specific ways in which government agencies interact with 
society. Section 4 then links these to different capacity challenges. Specifically, 
reflexive settings require that agencies learn how to: listen to what is going on in 
society; offer their own interpretations; understand how social interpretations 
relate to the agency’s policy goals, and, most challenging of all, engage in 
dialogue with society to construct a consensus. In short, they must learn how to 
deploy and develop four types of OPC—absorptive, administrative, analytical 
and communicative. Our empirical analysis focusses on the impact of different 
                                                          
1 All 13 of the agency officials involved in the MBCP initiative have been interviewed for this 
research. 
 learning environments on the HSE’s ability to develop each of these capacities in 
their engagement with citizens about social beliefs on health and safety, and how 
these capacities might in turn change the policy learning environment. We 
conclude by asking what a learning approach tells us about how agencies can 
develop OPC. 
 
9. 2. Building Organizational Political Capacity in UK Health and Safety 
Policy: A Problem of Learning 
 
Despite being a long-established research theme in the private sector 
management literature, public organizations’ reputations have only begun to be 
seriously considered in political science in the last 15 years. Daniel Carpenter 
(see 2002, 2010) has been primarily responsible for the systematic treatment of 
regulatory agencies and reputation, theorizing in particular about how agencies 
build good reputations to increase their autonomy. Specifically, his seminal work 
on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has generated a key insight 
around which a research agenda is now being built (see Maor, 2015 for an 
overview of the key themes). Here, in a nutshell, is Carpenter’s argument: 
“…when trying to account for a regulator’s behaviour, look at the audience, and 
look at the threats” (Carpenter, 2010, p. 832, emphasis in original). 
 
What does this mean for the object of our enquiry—the HSE? This agency 
is an independent regulator for work-related health, safety and illness. 
Established in 1974, its core mission is to reduce work-related death and serious 
injury in the UK’s workplaces. The HSE enforces the Health and Safety at Work 
Act (1974) and associated regulations by: issuing improvement notices which, if 
breached, can result in prosecution (in 2013/14 the conviction rate was 95%); co-
regulating with local authority inspectors to enforce regulations; providing 
specialized inspections; and, conducting research on new workplace risks. Since 
its establishment, workplace deaths and injuries in the UK have fallen by over 
87% (HSE, 2014). Despite this stellar biography, since 2010, the HSE has been 
under sustained political pressure from the central government. Its core functions 
have been reviewed three times as part of the Conservative-led coalition 
government’s drive for regulatory simplification and smaller government 
(O’Neill, 2013; for the reviews see Löfstedt, 2011; Temple, 2014; Young, 2010). 
Central to these reviews is the need for the HSE to address the public perception 
that health and safety regulation is intrusive and over-bearing. 
HSE has four main audiences, each of which carries multiple expectations: 
experts that scrutinize its scientific analysis; courts that adjudicate on contested 
decisions; stakeholder groups of implementers and the regulated; and the wider 
society that the agency aims to protect. The capacity-building challenges 
involved with each audience are structured differently. Notably, some 
relationships are more insulated from political and media pressures than others, 
 making them easier for HSE to manage. Our analysis focusses on arguably the 
greatest OPC challenge faced by all agencies—learning with citizens. Citizens 
encounter health and safety regulations every day, and they do so in one-off 
exchanges. The high degree of implementation uncertainty that goes with this 
open environment makes it highly susceptible to political and media moves, 
making this the HSE’s biggest challenge. 
This uncertainty, along with the compensation and media blame cultures 
and political paradigm emphasizing the unwelcome prevalence of regulatory 
burdens, provide the conditions for health and safety to become a socially 
contested issue. In the last two decades, this contestation has manifested itself in 
the appearance of the meme ‘health and safety gone mad’, which is commonly 
used by citizens, the media and politicians (see Almond, 2009 for a discussion). 
In 2007, the HSE began to experiment with a communications strategy to engage 
the public that lampooned some of the most absurd media stories where health 
and safety rules—real and imagined—were used by public and private service 
providers to excuse unpopular or ill-informed decisions. To give a flavour of 
these ‘myths of the month’, one recurring case concerns local councils banning 
floral display hanging baskets in the name of health and safety regulations 
(Almond, 2009). No such regulation exists; rather health and safety is used as a 
fig-leaf to cover the real concern that these baskets may fall and injure a member 
of the public and leave the council open to civil legal action. 
The regulator has acted to defend its reputation, and that of the policy 
regime more generally, by consciously engaging citizens in a learning 
relationship. In the UK, health and safety legislation is not prescribed. Rather, it 
is goal-oriented and, as such, what compliance ‘looks like’ on the ground is 
locally negotiated with specialist HSE inspectors in local authorities and the 
general public. This reliance on how health and safety is perceived outside the 
agency means that a common policy understanding cannot be powered but rather 
must be puzzled (to paraphrase Heclo, 1974). 
And so, the agency believes that its only option is to build capacity by 
learning with citizens about the pre-eminent social beliefs and discourses that 
surround health and safety. Such learning relationships are just that—two-way 
interactions. The agency cannot simply focus on what its governance partners can 
be taught. Rather, capacity-building becomes about the understandings that all 
governance parties can generate through their interactions. 
In 2012, the HSE intensified its efforts to engage with the public and 
gather more health and safety myths by establishing the dedicated MBCP. While 
media stories are still included, the majority of the MBCP cases come from 
members of the public who complete an online questionnaire on the HSE’s 
 website.2 Between April 2012-April 2014, 920 submissions were made with 304 
of these ruled to be ‘myths’. Despite these myths’ frivolous nature, the ‘health 
and safety gone mad’ meme threatens the HSE’s reputation. Agencies’ 
reputations relate to their specific domain of expertise; the HSE does not have a 
strong or weak reputation in general, it has a reputation in relation to health and 
safety (Maor, 2015). The erroneous labelling of trivial decisions or silly rules as 
driven by health and safety regulations undermines the credibility of the HSE, 
and risks all health and safety measures becoming characterized as against the 
public interest, and undermines the agency’s reputation in government and 
beyond. For example, here is Prime Minister David Cameron pledging a multi-
pronged approach to cut back what he labels the ‘health and safety monster’ in 
the UK: “[Y]ou have got to look at the quantity of rules, and we are cutting them 
back. You have got to look at the way they are enforced, and we are making sure 
that is more reasonable” (in The Guardian, 5 January 2012). While not quite as 
damning as Newt Gingrich’s 1994 verdict that the FDA was the US’s “number 
one job killer” (Carpenter, 2010, p. 731), when added to the weight of formal 
reviews, budget reductions and increased workload the HSE’s reputation has 
been weakened (O’Neill, 2013). 
The empirical reality for the HSE chimes with Carpenter’s core argument 
about the centrality of these external threats, and the role played by political 
principals in stabilizing and destabilizing agencies. Yet, agencies’ reputations 
may not be as fragile and exogenously determined as Carpenter suggests. 
Notably, Maor argues that scholars must explore agencies’ ability to respond to 
threats and act “adaptively, strategically and opportunistically” to maintain, 
protect and (re)build good reputations (2015, p. 17). Indeed, this is what much of 
the literature does. Built on rational choice explanations, scholarship on 
bureaucratic reputation focusses on the strategic development of organizational 
capacity in these responses. Agencies variously manage their reputation through: 
the strategic use of knowledge (Rourke, 1961); decision timing and public 
observability (Carpenter, 2002), and strategic communication (Carpenter, 2010). 
We take a different analytical tack. While still exploring the role of OPC in the 
HSE’s reputation management, we replace utility maximization with analysis 
driven by policy learning. Reputation-sensitive agencies aim to learn how they 
are perceived out there in society, and use that knowledge to alter their behaviour 
and sometimes their goals. The relationship between learning—both inside and 
outside the agency—and reputation is beginning to be examined (most notably 
by Moffitt, 2010). However, such learning-infused approaches are still out-
numbered by rational choice driven analyses. 
 
 
9.3. Conceptualizing Learning Relationships 
                                                          
2 http://www.hse.gov.uk/contact/myth-busting.htm. 
  
The argument pursued here is that agencies develop and adapt organizational 
capacities that help them engage in productive learning relationships with their 
various audiences. By viewing OPC creation for reputation management through 
the analytical lens of policy learning, we treat capacity not simply as an objective 
good but as held in dynamic relationships between governance actors. 
Understanding these relationships means understanding how, what, when and 
why different actors learn and from whom. In this instance, we are interested in 
the interactions between an agency and citizens. What types of learning are the 
HSE and members of the public engaged in with the MBCP initiative? And, what 
types of OPC are generated by it? To link learning to capacity building, we first 
need to be clear about what we mean by policy learning. We take policy learning 
to mean the updating of beliefs on the basis on new information and debate. Yet, 
learning is not monolithic—indeed the social sciences literature reveals a variety 
of types with different participants. Seeking to systematize these, Dunlop and 
Radaelli (2013) develop a four-fold typology. Specifically, they propose that four 
learning types are a product of two conditions associated with regulatory 
environments. 
 
The first concerns the problem’s level of tractability. Where this is low—
i.e., the issue is socially contested or technically specialized—regulatory agencies 
must engage with either society or authoritative experts. Where tractability is 
high, the challenge is usually one of powering more than puzzling, and the 
problem dealt with through established groups of stakeholders or formal rules 
enforced by hierarchies (most commonly courts). The second condition concerns 
the certification of actors: that is, the extent to which a socially endorsed group 
exists with whom policymakers should direct their attention. Where no such 
certified group exists, learning participants with whom agencies must engage will 
be plural—composed of a range of interested actors or of wider society itself. 
Taken together, levels of issue tractability and actor certification provide the 
basic conditions for four types of policy learning that dominate the public policy 
literature (see Figure 9.1). 
These four types have been outlined in more detail in other places (Dunlop 
& Radaelli, 2013; Dunlop, 2014) and their differences are summarized in Table 
9.1. This chapter is interested in how OPC can be generated or inhibited in 
situations dominated by reflexive learning. Here, low problem tractability 
combines with a scarcity of socially certified experts, resulting in policy 
knowledge being created by a potentially infinite range of social actors. As 
participation increases, different types of knowledge come to the fore and 
received wisdom is challenged and recreated. The hierarchy of epistemic learning 
is replaced here by a range of codified and uncodified knowledge types—
substantive; value-based; experiential; innuendo and myth (Wegner et al., 1981) 
 —associated with complexity (Sanderson, 2002). 
Public engagement in reflexive learning is unavoidable. Indeed, agencies 
have long been pushed by elected politicians to open up to public scrutiny. While 
mechanisms like notice and comment, freedom of information and public 
advisory committees are monitoring devices for politicians, the public 
engagement they afford also advance an agency’s reputation and boost policy 
legitimacy (Moffitt, 2010, pp. 880–881). Where successful, public engagement 
offers a strong defence from political and media attack. Reflexive environments 
present considerable challenges however. Critically, agencies must decide how 
much they are willing to learn from and with society; essentially how much 
political capacity can be generated in these relationships? Do they remain aloof 
and simply monitor public responses to decisions, or invite full public review? In 
its ideal form, reflexive learning is in the Habermasian mode where 
policymakers’ attention is diffuse and puzzling is collective. Interactions here are 
cooperative and symmetric and dialogue force-free so that multiplicity of voices 
can be heard and preferences open to persuasion. 
The specific interest in this chapter is in how reputational management can 
be achieved or inhibited through reflexive learning. Before exploring what such 
learning settings imply for OPC, the next section unpacks reflexive learning in 
more detail. 
 
9.4. Unpacking Reflexive Learning 
 
Using a theory of adult learning that focusses on actors’ control over 
aspects of knowledge production, we expand the property space of each of the 
four types of learning (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013). By differentiating between 
instances when the policymaker in the agency is able to focus on the contents or 
objectives of the problem at hand (see Dunlop, 2009; Mocker & Spear, 1982), we 
capture four varieties of reflexive learning in which different types of OPC are 
generated (see Figure 9.2). By focussing on the extent to which policymakers can 
exert control over aspects of knowledge production, we can uncover the power 
dynamics at work in the construction of OPC when engaged in learning 
relationships with citizens. 
 Table 9.1 
Differentiating policy learning types. 
 
Learning as . . . Epistemic Reflexive Bargaining Hierarchical 
Knowledge use as . . . Instrumental Conceptual Political/symbolic Imposed 
Causal mechanism Expert teaching Deliberation Resource Institutional rules 
Interaction of policy actors as . . . Cooperative 
asymmetric 
Cooperative 
symmetric 
Competitive 
symmetric 
Competitive 
asymmetric 
Policy-makers’ attention as . . . Directed Diffuse/divided Selective Routinised 
Reputational benefits as . . . Achieving Facilitating Securing Assertion of clear 
 evidence-based wide ranging agreement from authoritative voice 
 policy gold debate and powerful  
 standard social stakeholders  
  accountability   
Policy pathologies as . . . Groupthink and 
stifled innovation 
Uneven capacity 
leads to spurious 
Regulatory 
capture 
Blocked learning 
through fear of 
  consensus  hierarchy 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Varieties of Policy Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dunlop and Radaelli (2013), p. 603: Figure 1. 
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In reflexive settings, the distribution of power is polyarchic: there must be 
room for force-free learning and exchange. The major issue for agencies that 
aim to engage with citizens is how to capture the knowledge that is ‘out there’ 
(much of which is non-professional and not codified). The ultimate aim is to 
develop governance architectures that facilitate the exploitation of innovation 
(Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008) and make a virtue of the many voices in society. 
This aim is embodied in the ideal type of reflexive learning where 
dialogue is deliberative (bold and underlined in Figure 9.2). Here, learning 
between agency and society is the outcome of iterative processes of 
communication, persuasion and invention (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013). In this 
most reflexive of spaces, what is learned is open as are the ends to which those 
  PROBLEM TRACTABILITY 
  LOW HIGH 
CERTIFICATION 
OF ACTORS 
LOW 
2. Reflexive learning 
 
 
 
3. Learning through 
bargaining 
HIGH 
1. Epistemic learning 
 
 
4. Learning in the shadow 
of hierarchy 
 lessons might be put. In this case, what health and safety regulation is and its 
objectives cannot be pre-set. Rather, they are co-produced in the act of learning. 
In this context, the first key task for the capacity-building agency is to create a 
governance architecture to support early and frequent deliberation. Recent work 
on engagement in the public understanding of science literature is informative. 
To qualify as a genuinely deliberative process, policymakers must engage 
publics ‘upstream’ of the decision-making process (Stirling, 2005) and allow 
discussion of fundamental substantive and normative questions. Building a 
consensus around these discussions is the next challenge for the agency. Where 
successful, such a socially sanctioned paradigm may smooth the agency’s path 
for a long time to come. But, if deliberation is insincere, or participation skewed 
towards a single viewpoint, the ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2004), 
learning may degenerate into little more than a spurious consensus generating 
further instability and reducing political capacity. 
 
Figure 9.2. Expanding Reflexive Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Dunlop & Radaelli (2013), p. 607, Figure 3 
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 Where learning is structured through experimental dialogue, agencies 
focus on gathering evidence and supporting knowledge creation in society to 
advance mutual understanding. The task or goal of this exercise is exogenously 
controlled. So, for regulatory agencies like the HSE, these tasks may be set by 
political principals or necessitated by high profile campaigns against the agency 
waged by stakeholders in the media. What matters is that the agency is seen to 
engage in boosting public awareness and understanding of its work, and is able to 
adjust its assumptions in the light of citizen feedback. But, there are no 
guarantees that what will be produced will satisfy the goal that has been set. At 
its weakest, engagement is a meaning-making exercise on the part of agencies 
and simply a guise for educating citizens and filling supposed knowledge 
deficits. In these cases, dialogue can break down, with citizens becoming 
sceptical of the enterprise. At its strongest, experimental processes involve the 
co-production of knowledge through trial and error, where Bayesian learning 
leads to the type of content that best suits the exogenous learning goal. 
Where learning takes the form of dialogue framing, policymakers engage 
in sense-making citizens experiences (Weick, 1995). Again, this is not a full two-
way relationship. Since they have no control over the specific content of what is 
learned, policymakers’ learning experience will operate through issue framing in 
the context of a pre-determined over-arching goal. By relying on citizens for the 
actual content of what is learned, policymakers risk seeing only what they think 
is relevant to an objective. Thus, what policymakers learn is contingent on how 
they frame their objective. 
The last type of reflexive learning concerns evolutionary dialogues 
between agency policymakers and their social audiences. Here, learning takes 
place in loose issue networks where what is learned is random and participants 
constantly change. Evolutionary learning cannot be controlled, manipulated or 
shaped but concerns monitoring what is going on in society. Agency activity here 
is not to co-produce, educate or select knowledge with and from citizens. Rather, 
capacity building lies in its ability to listen to the ‘static’ noise in society. 
Gathering such intelligence is the stuff of early warning systems and is essential 
if agencies are to avoid embarrassing gaffs or accusations that they have taken 
their eye off the ball—it demands organizational patience and memory-making. 
 
9. 5. Busting Myths and Managing Reputations with Four Organizational 
Political Capacities 
 
The four different reflexive learning challenges outlined can be linked to 
distinct types of OPC found in public administration and management accounts 
of institutional learning and capacity building (notably, Bennett & Howlett, 1992; 
Borrás, 2011; Zahra & George, 2002). These are: absorptive capacity (ACAP); 
administrative capacity (ADCAP); analytical capacity (ANCAP); and 
 communicative capacity (COMCAP). These capacity types map onto the four 
reflexive learning challenges concerning: what the agency learns from society in 
each; the agency’s aim; the functional forms of reflexive learning that strong 
capacities can support; and, the degenerative forms of learning that may result 
where capacity is incomplete or weak (summarized in Table 9.2). 
What are the merits of linking types of organizational political capacity 
with types of learning? Earlier, we defined policy learning as the updating of 
beliefs. This treats learning as an action-oriented, relational activity. Even a 
decision not to change behaviour or preferences on the basis of updated 
knowledge represents an active choice being exercised by policymakers. Thus, 
when we explore capacity through the learning lens, we treat these capacities as 
dynamic in two ways. OPCs can be changed—as learning circumstances change 
so too can capacities—and OPCs can, in turn, effect organizational choice and 
sometimes change. 
 
 
9. 5.1. Absorptive Capacity (ACAP) through Evolutionary Dialogues 
 
Management researchers use the idea of absorptive capacity (ACAP) to 
explore a range of knowledge creation and utilisation activities that help firms 
gain competitive advantage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Empirical studies 
demonstrate significant relationships between ACAP and innovative outputs 
(Zahra & George, 2002, p. 185). The ACAP literature is marked by a diversity of 
definitions; this analysis is interested in the acquisitive type of ACAP which is 
possible when policymakers and societies engage in learning in the evolutionary 
mode. 
 
Table 9.2: Organizational Political Capacities and Reflexive Learning 
 
OPC as…. Reflexive 
learning 
as . . . 
Agency 
learns 
about . . . 
Agency aim is . . 
. 
Reflexive 
learning 
functional as . 
. . 
Reflexive 
learning 
degeneration 
as 
. . . 
Absorptive 
(ACAP) 
Evolutionary Listening and 
memory-making 
Acquisition of 
social knowledge 
Deciphering, storing 
and remembering 
social noise 
Society is 
heard 
passively and 
forgotten 
Administrative 
(ADCAP) 
Experimental Meaning-
making 
Exploitation of 
social knowledge 
Co-producing 
policy 
content 
Citizens are 
‘educated’ and 
deficits filled 
Analytical 
(ANCAP) 
Framing Sense-making Assimilation of 
social knowledge 
Understanding 
citizens’ 
perspectives 
to inform policy 
goals 
Politically 
selective use 
of 
social 
argument 
 Communicative 
(COMCAP) 
Deliberative Opening-up Knowledge 
transformation 
Socially-sanctioned 
paradigm creation 
Spurious 
consensus 
Source: Elaboration of Dunlop (2014). 
 
 
 
Here, we are concerned with the value the HSE places on acquiring the 
knowledge that exists in society. How that knowledge is understood, 
transformed or exploited is not the issue. In evolutionary learning, agencies are 
building capacity to listen to what is going on. What matters are the routines and 
processes in place to gather evidence that allow an organization to respond and, 
if necessary, to adjust policy. 
At a basic level, ACAP requires that the agency understands the need to 
engage with the external world. The HSE’s information-gathering culture is 
strong, and understanding the world ‘out there’ is seen as a core part of their 
business (interviews with press office officials and policy team, October 2013). 
Its role as a guardian of health and safety legislation in the UK ensures that 
keeping up to date with how these regulations ‘play out’ on the ground is critical 
to the agency’s survival and effectiveness. As was intimated earlier, in the last 
decade the agency has diversified its reconnaissance strategy—moving beyond 
listening to stakeholders to engaging citizens. The HSE has engaged in 
occasional surveys of the public—in particular when the ‘health and safety gone 
mad’ expression first began to take hold in the early 2000s (Elgood et al., 2004). 
But, the centrepiece of this listening operation is daily media monitoring. 
The agency uses a specialist media monitoring contractor to search the UK 
national print and broadcast media to record every mention of HSE as an 
agency, and health and safety as a system or culture. The service flags priority 
issues, HSE campaigns, board members and linked organizations, and are stories 
rated on a favourability scale. The monitoring service provides the cuttings or 
summary of the stories, and colour coded digest each day that allows the HSE to 
‘take the temperature’ of the citizens on health and safety. To give a sense of 
scale, in 2012/13 and 2013/14 the HSE received 2612 and 1510 stories referring 
to health and safety as a culture (Dunlop, 2015). 
The ability to acquire external knowledge enhances organizations’ 
strategic flexibility and degrees of freedom to adapt to dynamic environments 
(Zahra & George, 2002), and allows them to direct their focus on the content or 
objectives of their activities – or both. Success in information acquisition has 
three key dimensions (Zahra & George, 2002, p. 189). The first two concern 
intensity and speed; the effort and reaction speed of monitoring beliefs in society 
that may enhance or challenge an agency’s ability to defend its reputation and 
make effective policies. And so, as efforts increase to detect the social ‘static’, 
 the agency’s long-range vision is enhanced as potential problems on the horizon 
come into view early. 
Controlling the speed and intensity of knowledge acquisition involves 
trade-offs, of course. Horizon scanning is an imprecise and costly science. The 
speed of knowledge acquisition is fundamentally problematic—not least because 
the timelines for knowledge development in society and polity are very different 
(Dunlop, 2010). Social beliefs and knowledge often grow slowly and are 
‘creeping’ (Weiss, 1980). As agencies survey the landscape daily, there is the 
possibility that they will miss the bigger picture forming. These different 
temporal horizons often lead to policy gaffes—what may seem like an 
inconsequential speck on the horizon and so ignorable by policymakers, can in 
the blink of an eye (or the click of a mouse) become an urgent problem. For the 
HSE, the effort to absorb is considerable and its monitoring strategy gets 
intelligence to the agency fast. Indeed, the first job of the day in the press office 
is to analyse the daily briefing document sent overnight on the previous day’s 
news (interview with HSE press office team, October 2014). But, the ability of 
the organization to remember what it has heard and piece together patterns in the 
data is less clear. 
The third dimension of acquisition is the source of information. Agencies 
engaged in capacity building must develop their peripheral vision to see what 
might be coming out of left field, or from unexpected sources. The direction of 
knowledge accumulation is key; with no locus of control over the content and 
ends of learning, policymakers must cast their nets widely to capture knowledge 
which represents the complexity and variation of social views. 
For all organizations, the development of peripheral vision is fraught with 
difficulty. By restricting itself to press and broadcast media, the HSE is missing 
social media and online worlds—i.e. ‘Big Data’ (interview with press officer, 
April 2014). The extent to which citizens’ discussions in these fora provide 
alternative information to the HSE is unclear. But, it would certainly offer an 
opportunity to make new connections with the public and provide information 
that is unmediated by the media. Given the inevitable perceptions that particular 
newspapers and providers evoke, by gathering social media the HSE would be 
more able to listen without prejudice. Yet, it is still gathering large volumes of 
information with the knowledge that much of the information gathered may be 
irrelevant. But we must recall that the purpose of evolutionary learning is to 
listen—not to use. This is a mapping exercise where success is being aware of 
and remembering the beliefs about the agency and its work that exist in the 
external world. 
 
9.5.2. Administrative Capacity (ADCAP) in Experimental Settings 
 
Administrative capacity (ADCAP) involves the ability of an agency to use 
 its resources and direct its operations to work with governance partners to 
transform what is known and understood about an issue. Here, learning takes an 
experimental form, with policymakers finding ways to engage citizens in 
meaning-making around an issue. 
Such experimental dialogues can result in citizens being ‘educated’ top-
down and fed a ‘party line’ by agencies. Yet at its most functional, experimental 
learning enables the creation and exploitation of new understandings. Agencies 
can enhance their existing understandings as they point to evidence offered by 
citizens in order to meet or even change an exogenously set objective. 
When we think about ADCAP in the HSE, we are most basically thinking 
about the agency’s legal freedom to act. This concerns how policymakers’ 
understand their competence in an area. Legal obligations and historic policy 
legacies will shape the room for manoeuvre and the ability to engage in 
experimental dialogues with citizens. Where regulations require that agencies 
engage in public education exercises, such institutional hierarchies can of course 
work in favour of reflexive learning. Freedom to act also concerns temporal and 
financial resources. Finding social knowledge which is exploitable may take 
time—engaging a cross-section of citizens who are willing and able to comment 
on a policy matter is not a one-shot game. Just how long it takes is, of course, 
unknown: attracting a critical mass of consultation respondents or submissions to 
an information campaign is governed more by serendipity than administrative 
science. 
For the HSE, there are few barriers in terms of legal scope. Indeed, a core 
part of its business is to advise the working public on their occupational rights 
and on employers’ legal obligations. Yet, these are information campaigns that 
are focussed on highly specific occupation issues—e.g., working at height, 
occupational stress, or asbestos handling. Exploring and co-producing social 
knowledge on the pervasive and media-friendly issue of health and safety as a 
culture is a tougher challenge, and one which the HSE has chosen to take on. 
Specifically, the MBCP offers a way for the HSE to speak the language of 
citizens and the media back to them. By releasing its rulings on the myth cases 
sent in—through press releases; email bulletins; and, occasionally funny 
cartoons—the HSE engages citizens in an experimental dialogue about what the 
erroneous use of the term ‘health and safety’ looks like. This meaning-making 
involves using the story submitted to construct the citizen as being tricked out of 
good customer service or receiving poor communication. The idea of the citizen 
as having common sense in the face of incompetent employers, retailers or 
bureaucrats using health and safety is a recurrent theme. 
The MBCP is routinely praised by politicians and consumer groups as an 
example of innovative communication (Löfstedt, 2011; Temple, 2014; Young, 
2010), and has attracted interest from other agencies in the UK (and beyond) 
 interested in developing similar schemes (interview with HSE policy team, 
August 2013). Yet, the success of this meaning-making is unclear. The 
methodological challenges in analysing the impact of the political capacity held 
in the MBCP are considerable: a clear correlation cannot be made between trends 
of favourable newspaper stories and the existence of the initiative. 
And so, the extent to which understandings about health and safety policy 
and systems are being co-produced is uncertain. The HSE has internalized much 
of what it has learned from the public to inform information campaigns for more 
specific issues, but the public’s view is unclear (interview with policymaker, 
January 2014). For example, when citizens read a case of a myth, is it understood 
as the agency reaching out to them to explore (mis)conceptions, or is it regarded 
more cynically as a public relations stunt? Do these stories prompt citizens to 
voice their own stories? While the extent of experimental learning is not clear, 
the diversity of the MBCP cases and the goal-oriented nature of health and safety 
make it unlikely that the MBCP could degenerate where citizens are passive 
recipients from lessons provided from those at the top.  
 
9.5.3. Analytical Capacity (ANCAP) through Dialogue Framing 
 
The previous two capacity types have addressed learning scenarios where 
agencies have little focus on the objectives of learning: in ACAP the interest is 
simply to be aware and ADCAP it is to focus on content. But, of course, 
policymakers also have end goals. There are learning challenges where attention 
is focussed on meeting a preference by drawing on the understandings of society. 
Where the agency’s ability to meet a priority is framed by social understandings, 
analytical capacity (ANCAP) is required. Put simply, the agency can only meet 
its policy goals and protect its reputation if it understands what the public is 
saying. This is the realm of knowledge assimilation and sense-making. 
Like most regulatory agencies, the HSE uses consultations to call for 
stakeholders views on specific issues. These are usually highly technical 
dialogues and rarely involve citizen respondents. While the public voice is in 
some way represented by the information gleaned from the media monitoring, the 
MBCP scheme is designed to directly elicit views from ordinary members of the 
public. Unlike most consultations, which are necessarily framed by an agency’s 
goal, the data collected by the MBCP are driven by the public. The online form 
for the reporting of suspected health and safety myths is open. Citizens can insert 
as much or as little information as they want. In some cases, the HSE will contact 
the author to ask for clarification or a specific piece of information. But, 
critically, it is expressed in the citizen’s words—reducing the likelihood of co-
option. 
The HSE makes sense of the case by referring it to sector specialists in the 
agency who assess the possible risks involved and any legislation that may be 
 applicable. The case is then sent to the panel who decide whether it is a myth or a 
sensible decision. In 2012/13, seven of the 194 cases taken forward to the panel 
were deemed to be ‘sensible’ (Dunlop, 2015). The rest were put into one of four 
myth categories: over-interpretation of health and safety legislation; 
communication problem; excuse for poor customer service; or, the domain of a 
different regulator. 
This process of categorization facilitates the interpretation and 
comprehension that allows HSE professionals to think outside their own box. The 
MBCP affords the agency a window on the everyday world where the use of 
health and safety is underpinned by heuristics that may differ radically from 
those found in the HSE. Yet, there is a problem of selection bias. The MBCP is a 
supply-driven exercise –the HSE can only analyse the cases that are submitted. 
And so, it is impossible to estimate the representativeness of the cases they 
consider. 
What of this sense-making? In its perfect form, what is learned by these 
social frames may be used to adapt policy goals and (re)orient them towards 
society. But, the fundamental challenge for the HSE is that it enforces legislation 
made elsewhere, legislation which is goal-oriented and not prescriptive. Rather, 
the promise of the MBCP is to assist the HSE in understanding the popular image 
of health and safety which can inform the language or methods it uses to manage 
policy delivery and enforcement. This hard constraint makes full exploitation of 
this analytical capacity unlikely. It also makes it unlikely that MBCP would be 
used by the HSE in an overtly political way. 
 
9.5.4. Communicative Capacity (COMCAP) in Deliberative Settings 
 
When they deliberate with the public, agencies focus on both the ends and 
means of policy—i.e. what should be done and what knowledge is relevant to 
doing so. In short, they aim to develop communicative capacity (COMCAP). 
COMCAP concerns the extent to which the agency is willing and able to open up 
the goals and understandings of policy and engage in public critique of them. The 
aim here is to transform knowledge about the matter at hand to enable agencies to 
refine their own understandings as new social knowledge is grafted onto or 
replaces agency thinking, or old interpretations are reconsidered in light of wider 
social debate. 
 
Transformative results rely on synergy, recodification and bi-sociation in 
knowledge production (Zahra & George, 2002, p. 190). Most commonly, 
synergies are created with citizens using deliberative techniques such as 
consensus conferences. By giving a cross-section of social actors the space to 
question policymakers, agencies and the public can exchange their views and 
perceptions about an issue of concern. For the transformative potential of these 
 exercises to be realized, however, government actors must be willing to either 
adjust their own understandings—recodify—or, more radically, to combine their 
own views with those of society to create an entirely different policy paradigm. 
For the HSE, COMCAP is low. Given the agency’s inability to change 
legislation the lack of engagement in deliberation with society is understandable. 
But, it is also a conscious move and indicative of the agency’s wider political 
vulnerability. Opening systems up to deliberation can be highly risky. In the 
absence of a willingness or ability to change, engagement strategies become little 
more than cosmetic exercises which citizens easily see through (see for example 
‘GM Nation’ in the UK [Rowe et al., 2005]). The risks here are considerable; 
trust in risk management systems is asymmetrical—it is easier to destroy than to 
create (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). 
 
9.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter elaborates an analytical framework that explores reputation 
management by linking policy learning and OPC. It has used this to explore a 
‘live’ empirical challenge being tackled by a UK regulator. The HSE’s myth-
busting initiative reveals considerable reflexive learning and relationship building 
in three of the four modes. The agency is developing antenna to absorb what is 
going on in society (ACAP); using the cases as communicative tools to engage in 
meaning-making (ADCAP); and developing an appreciation of citizens’ 
heuristics on health and safety by making sense of the cases submitted (ANCAP). 
The absence of deliberative learning highlights that some capacities—in this 
instance COMCAP—may be left uncultivated because the gains are marginal, or 
the risks of creating countervailing pressures too high. 
By connecting the learning and governance literatures, the framework 
demonstrates that in regulatory settings characterized by multiple actors and 
implementation uncertainty, OPC takes many forms and has many outcomes. 
This emphasis on equifinality matches the idiosyncratic, multi-dimensional and 
socially constructed nature of all types of organizational capacity. Applying the 
learning framework to the other eight parts of the Wu et al.’s (2015) capacity 
matrix   may help uncover the multiplicity of different skills that create value. 
What it also reveals is that while there will be some common mechanisms 
developed by government agencies to strengthen their ability to learn from and 
with society, the ways in which different types of capacity develop and the 
ultimate blend that exists at any one time are highly contingent on the policy 
challenge at hand. 
Future research could usefully explore how capacity building can be re-
designed. By identifying the two central dimensions of learning, the framework 
reveals what is required for learning to succeed. Where learning is incomplete 
 and OPCs’ strategies do not match the reality of the context, the model can be 
used to generate alternative or corrective public engagement strategies. 
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